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In this contribution I defend the thesis that Hegel’s notion of species (Gattung) is not merely the 
name given to a group of self-reproducing living beings but rather it is at the basis of the Hegelian 
naturalistic conceptions of self-conscious life, sociality and world history. I maintain that self-
reflection and self-referring negativity are the main characteristics of the self-conscious life and 
they determine the features of both the individual self-consciousness and the entire human spe-
cies by shaping social practices and world history as acts of actualized freedom. Therefore, the 
definition of human species goes far beyond the description of its natural features and depends 
on the fact that self-consciousness is able to determine itself by negating external powers or con-
ditioning. The main argument of this contribution is that human species and its historical evolu-
tion can be defined by means of this self-referring negativity and by self-consciousness’ capacity 
to place the external reality under an order of values and concept autonomously yielded. 
 
KEYWORDS 
Self-conscious life, norms, social practices, negativity, naturalism, social freedom 
 
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
Recently some Hegelian scholars have highlighted that Hegel’s theory on self-
consciousness is based on features that are determined by virtue of the living nature 
and dispositions of the subject, rather than by the logical characteristics of thinking. 
 
1 This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and inno-
vation program under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 704127. 
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Hegel’s version of naturalism maintains that the behaviour of a living being is estab-
lished by the possibilities of its own organic nature and by the significance that those 
possibilities represent.
2
 As a consequence of this, self-conscious creatures develop 
a particular form of life defined by the way of self-consciousness. Similarly, specu-
lation itself is not a propositional attitude towards reality, but rather a theoretical 
disposition embedded in the natural dimension of the living, desiring and longing 
subject. Consequently, the logical attitude towards the independent reality of the 
object, phenomenologically called by Hegel “otherness”, does not consist in prop-
ositional inferring, but rather it is a dialectical activity by which self-consciousness 
determines itself as an autonomous subject within an objective world. The dialectics 
of self-consciousness establishes a relation with the otherness based on the sponta-
neous faculty of producing an order of concepts by which otherness’ independence 
can be grasped and eventually superseded; this is the speculative act, metaphorically 
defined as “the labour of the notion”.
3
 This contribution aims to explain how He-
gel’s peculiar version of naturalism tackles the question concerning the historical 
evolution of the social practices, the nature of the self-conscious species and the 
normative by elaborating a complex theory about the dialectics of self-conscious-
ness, i.e. its peculiar way of interacting with external conditionings. In order to carry 
out this analysis on freedom, sociality and human history I intend to deal with some 
points in which Hegel describes how the institutionalization of social practices 
changes the nature of self-conscious life and self-determination. At the same time I 
will try to show that this institutionalization emerges as a necessary and concrete 
fulfilment of the self-conscious life and that there is a naturalistic presumption in 
Hegel’s account of the human practices and their historical evolution. I will start by 
giving an account of the role played by the concept in Hegel’s system and the natu-
ralism entailed in it. Successively, I will deal with the notion of social freedom and 
how it affects the self-conscious life. Thirdly, I will tackle Hegel’s theory on norms, 
recognition and sociality and maintain that the normative environment is necessary 
for self-conscious life in order to attain freedom. Eventually, I will explain that the 
evolution of the world history is the result of a self-reflection about the way how the 
human species organizes its activities and practices over time. 
2.  HEGEL’S NATURALISM OF THE CONCEPTUAL 
Hegel conceives of the concept (Begriff) as a natural practical disposition of the 
living subject towards the independence of the reality and not as a logical tool for 
 
2 Pinkard (2017), 31. 
3 Hegel PS (1997), 43: “True thoughts and scientific insight are only to be won through the labour 
of the Notion. Only the Notion can produce the universality of knowledge which is neither common 
vagueness nor the inadequacy of ordinary common sense, but a fully developed, perfected cognition”. 
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inferring true statements. This revolution in the theory of the conceptual had been 
introduced in the Critique of Judgment, in which Kant gives an account of the re-
flexive judgment by marking the difference from the so called objective judgement, 
which was addressed in the first Critique. Following Kant, whereas human judging 
of objects refers to a mathematical ‘agitation’ of the mind, i.e. to the power to have 
an adequate representation of the reality by means of true statements, the reflexive 
judgment is related to a peculiar ‘power of desire’ [Begehrensvermögen] (Kant CJ, 
1987: 101) or ‘a dynamical attunement of the mind’ (Kant CJ, 1987: 101). Without 
doubt Hegel follows the path and the suggestions of the third Critique in which 
cognitive capacities are explained in a wider way than in the first one that exclusively 
puts the focus on the transcendental conditions of objective thinking. The chapter 
on Self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit tackles the question of the 
conceptual, freedom and the speculative by linking it to the very natural and practi-
cal features of self-consciousness.
4
 In order to achieve independence from any ex-
ternal powers, the subject need to relate the external reality to its cognitive patterns 
and to acquire a sort of mastery over the objective reality. This operation is very 
similar to what Kant calls the deduction of the categories that demonstrates how the 
logical concepts “must always contain the pure a priori conditions of a possible ex-
perience and of an object of it, for otherwise not only would nothing at all be thought 
through them, but also without data they would not even be able to arise in thinking 
at all”.
5
 Although Kant intends here to point out that no experience is possible with-
out the spontaneous activity of the intellect, by doing so he also highlights the infinite 
power of the autonomous subject that applies its own logical patterns to the object. 
Also Hegel addresses this spontaneous act of relating the object to the cognitive 
patterns of consciousness, but he deploys it in a naturalistic way by accounting for 
the practical mode of the self-conscious life,
6
 which becomes free from external 
conditioning by placing external reality under an order of concepts autonomously 
yielded. Such speculative effort preserves individual identity from the alienation 
 
4 Following Hegel, freedom is the condition of the subject in which there are no relations of de-
pendence from or before other subjects or external powers and in which otherness is somehow “do-
mesticated” and made familiar. See Neuhouser (2000), 20: “To apprehend the fundamental ration-
ality and goodness of reality as a whole is to learn that, contrary to appearances, the world we inhabit 
is not alien to our deepest aspirations but is instead a realm within which rational subjects can be ‘at 
home,’ or ‘with themselves.’ For a subject to achieve freedom in the speculative sense, then, is for it 
to overcome its original alienation from the world by finding itself (its aspirations as a rational subject) 
to be fully realized in an other (the world), which, when comprehended philosophically, ceases to 
confront the subject as an external, inhospitable other.” 
5 Kant CPR (1998), 227. 
6 This subjective effort to master external reality by sublating its independence is called by Hegel 
‘return from otherness’ [Rückkher aus dem Anderssein]. See Hegel PS (1997), 105. 
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properly produced by the independence of external factors affecting self-determi-
nation and assures that living subject remains with oneself [bei sich selbst]
7
, i.e. free. 
In fact, individuality as concept of itself is infinity and self-referring negativity, i.e. 
“the ultimate source of all activity, life”.
8
 Nonetheless, in the emergence of the oth-
erness as counterpart, the nature of freedom changes from being speculative to be-
ing social or practical, while otherness ceases to be a form of natural constrain or 
limitation and becomes an other similar self-conscious individual.
9
 The confronta-
tion with an other ‘I’ represents a fundamental milestone in Hegel’s philosophy 
because it marks the difference between the very natural and one-sided dimension 
of self-conscious life as infinite self-referring negativity and the dimension of social 
norms and interaction. In spite of this demarcation, Hegel claims that the structure 
of self-consciousness remains unchanged as it preserves self-determination and self-
referring negativity as its fundamental features.  
3. SELF-CONSCIOUS LIFE BETWEEN SPECULATIVE AND SOCIAL 
FREEDOM 
The notion of self-consciousness represents the core of the Hegelian philosophy 
and is at the basis of his theory on freedom and absolute. Freedom’s primary con-
dition is the reflection about the self, which is fostered by what Hegel calls “self-
referring negativity”, namely the act of negating external conditioning by reflecting 
on one's own principles and identities. This self-referring thinking activity concerns 
the relations of dependence between the subject and the object and yields a concept 
by which self-consciousness is able to grasp the dialectics subject-object. What is 
compelling in Hegel’s theory of speculation is the idea that in thinking I’m not in 
another while the other is related to me: this achievement represents the identifica-
tion with otherness, which I would call speculative freedom.
10
 Moreover, specula-
tion is strictly related to life because without a self-differentiating living subject we 
 
7 Hegel PR (1991), §§ 7, 23. 
8 Hegel PR (1991), § 7. 
9 Hegel PR (1991), § 7Z: “Then the third moment is that ‘I’ is with itself in its limitation, in this 
other, as it determines itself, it nevertheless still remains with itself and does not cease to hold fast to 
the universal. This, then, is the concrete concept of freedom, whereas the two previous moments 
have been found to be throughly abstract and one-sided. But we already posses this freedom in the 
form of feeling [Empfindung], for example in friendship and love. Here, we are not sidedly within 
ourselves, but willingly limit ourselves with reference to an other, even while knowing ourselves in this 
limitation as ourselves.” 
10 Hegel PS (1997), 120: “For in thinking, the object does not present itself in picture-thoughts but 
in Notions, i.e. in a distinct being-in-itself or intrinsic being, consciousness being immediately aware 
that this is not anything distinct from itself … In thinking, I am free, because I am not in an other, but 
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could not have either self-reflection or the act of return from otherness. Speculative 
freedom as result of a reflexive act of return from otherness, i.e. the infinite identi-
fication with the absolute, represents the fundamental structure of self-conscious-
ness and is attained by means of a naturalistic approach underlining the central role 
played by life. This develops a strong idea of subjectivity based on the autonomous 
striving for freedom and independence, which can be reached by overcoming oth-
erness’ independence and establishing identity with the objective world.  
However, in the social dimension the other becomes another independent sub-
ject and the consequent reflexive act endorsing freedom is not a mere speculative 
act, but an act promoting interaction and institutionalization of practices. Whereas 
the element of life preserves the subject from being reduced to mere otherness or 
objectivity, the social factor of interaction pushes the subject to recognize the ele-
ment of freedom in another subject and to evolve the nature of freedom itself. This 
is the logical result Hegel achieves in considering the living subject as irreducible to 
objectivity and endorsing autonomy as a logical movement of the conceptual 
[Bewegung des Begriffs] within the subject itself. At this point a coherent question 
is, why and how does the element of social confrontation with another subject 
emerge? Hegel’s answer in the Phenomenology of Spirit is that “Self-consciousness 
achieves its satisfaction only in another Self-consciousness”
11
 because desire estab-
lishes a kind of relation with reality that constantly reproduces the object of desire 
itself. On the contrary, a relation with another subject having the same structure of 
self-referring negativity and self-certainty assures that satisfaction does not imply 
endless reproducing of needs.
12
 The living self-consciousness develops, hence, a 
community of similar living beings connected to each other through the belonging-
ness to the same Genus or species [Gattung], the species of self-consciousness.
13
 
Although Hegel’s aim is to address social recognition among rational individuals, 
these passages account for life and genus in a very wide sense including all species. 
In fact, as he highlights in the Science of Logic “life, or organic nature, is the stage 
 
remain simply and solely in communion with myself, and the object, which is for me the essential 
being, is in undivided unity my being-for-myself; and my activity in conceptual thinking is a movement 
within myself.” 
11 Hegel PS (1997), 110. 
12 Hegel PS (1997), 109: “Thus self-consciousness, by its negative relation to the object, is unable 
to supersede it; it is really because of that relation that it produces the object again, and the desire as 
well. It is in fact, something other than self-consciousness that is the essence of Desire; … On account 
of the independence of the object, therefore, it can achieve satisfaction only when the object itself 
effects the negation within itself; and it must carry out this negation of itself in itself, for it is in itself 
the negative, and must be for the other what it is.” 
13 Hegel PS (1997), 110: “But this universal independent nature in which negation is present as 
absolute negation, it the genus as such, or the genus as self-consciousness. Self-consciousness achieves 
is satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.” 
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of nature at which the concept emerges, but as blind, as unaware of itself and un-
thinking”;
14
 this happens because life contains the speculative element that one still 
observes in unaware and unthinking forms of life. The differentiation of singular 
individuals within the genus and the preservation of the latter by means of the phe-
nomena of reproduction, which Hegel connects to the overcoming of death as bas-
ilar instinct, is a fundamental structure with many theoretical implication regarding 
life. It has also several points in common with what Philippa Foot and Michael 
Thompson maintain about practical goodness, which they connect to the natural-
istic dimension of the species.
15
 Following them, the good for the humans has to be 
found in the natural characteristic of the species rather than in transcendental and 
universal principles of action. Goodness is, hence, constituted within the naturalistic 
feature of a species and, in the case of the human, it has to do with a specific practical 
intelligence called by Aristotle phronesis.
16
 Particularly for Thompson, social prac-
tices cannot be defined out of the naturalistic analysis of the human species because 
of the logical continuity between living dimension and goodness. Consequently, hu-
man goodness represents the practical intelligence and has as object the human it-
self and not a transcendental or universal law determining an universal definition of 
rightness. Similarly, Hegel bases his idea of human practices and social interaction 
by starting with the primary elements of life and gaining from them the very basilar 
structure of the self-conscious life.  
Sociality differs from the relation to the object of desire because it emerges from 
the interaction between living beings having a similar structure of self-referring neg-
ativity that the object of desire does not have. This interaction establishes a practical 
ambit in which self-consciousness affirms its own independence by attaining recog-
nition.
17
 As a consequence of the fact that the practical ambit in which self-conscious-
ness affirms its independence is social, concrete freedom has to be intended as so-
cial and not as merely speculative. Freedom is social because the living being, par-
ticularly the self-aware one, is a practical one and its goodness is defined within the 
practical ambit of interaction with individuals of the same species who are able to 
evolve similar activities and institutions. Therefore, the life-practice continuity ex-
plained by the notion of species indicates the continuity between speculative free-
dom as sublation of otherness’ independence and social freedom as freedom within 
 
14 Hegel SL (1969), 586. 
15
 Foot (2001) and Thompson (2008). 
16 Thompson (2017), 29-77. 
17 This social dimension is also practical because there is no interaction without any practice and 
in this point Hegel is very sympathetic with Wittgenstein’s idea of form of life (Lebensform). See 
Wittgenstein (2001), § 241: “ ‘So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what 
is false?’ – It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language their use. 
that is not agreement in opinions but in form of life”. 
 
349  The Dialectics of Self-Conscious Life and the Constitution of Social Practices in Hegel’s …   
 
a social context. The species is indeed the fundamental natural characteristic of liv-
ing individuals supplying them with belongingness to the same group of individuals 
sharing both natural and practical features. It represents, hence, the natural element 
at the basis of the evolution of social freedom because it stretches the living dimen-
sion into the practical one. As M. Thompson rightly maintains, the acting of a par-
ticular living being inevitably falls under the “wider context of vital description” 
(Thompson 2008, 59) of a species or a life-form fixing the practical features of every 
individual of that species.
18
 It is, therefore, impossible to establish freedom for self-
conscious beings out of the natural dimension of the species and this is the reason 
why humans need the relation with individuals having the same structure of self-
referring negativity in order to attain freedom in the practical sphere. Freedom can-
not be explained by means of the external relations among similar individuals, but 
only by making recourse to a wider description of the species by which also the 
external relations can be thought. 
4. RECOGNITION, SOCIAL INTERACTIONS AND NORMS 
Whereas freedom means to be with oneself [bei sich selbst], social freedom 
means to be with oneself in another [bei sich selbst in einem Anderem],
19
 and re-
quires the relational condition of a subject having a social relationship with other 
similar individuals. As Allen Wood rightly states,
20
 freedom is for Hegel a relational 
property of the agency because it is determined by the movement of positing both 
itself and another and, although the will is only free with itself, freedom is achieved 
as a result of the peculiar relation the will establishes with the external reality. This 
is the reason why freedom is achieved as outcome of a relation with the otherness, 
a sort of self-mastery attained by confronting otherness’ independence. The kind of 
relation the subject establishes with a similar one is based on recognition that does 
not require the sublation of its independence, but rather the acceptance of its au-
tonomy. This system of recognition is the requisite for developing social practices 
as counterpart of nature, namely as second nature. In the normative dimension of 
 
18 Thompson (2008), 57: “…if a language contains any representation of members of the yet nar-
rower class of organisms –‘actual objects’ for which actuality takes the form of life– it must also include 
a battery of what we may call ‘life-descriptions”. Such would be, for example: representations of parts 
as organs or ‘members’; representations of particular sorts of goings-on as vital operations…”. 
19 Hegel Mitschriften (1983), 216: “The free will wills only itself, wills nothing but to be free; it 
receives only its freedom as intuition. The will determines itself, it puts itself into an object; but this 
object is the will itself, the will is with itself in  its object” 
20 Wood (1990), 46-47. 
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social relation needs can be recognized and institutionalized and the nature is re-
garded as included in the social dimension of norms. Recognition represents, 
hence, the condition in which speculative freedom attains a social status and the 
individual condition is accepted by other individuals. Moreover, the recognitive dy-
namic develops in both the natural dimension of needs and in the social dimension 
of interaction like a bridge between material and spiritual conditions of the social 
life. In fact, in the Jenaer Systementwürfe, an unpublished work preceding the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit, Hegel pretty clearly states that the condition to be recognized 
[das Anerkanntsein] is immediate effectuality [unmittelbare Wirklichkeit], because 
only in this condition one’s natural needs receive legitimacy.
21
 Immediacy notori-
ously is the characteristic of nature and Hegel in this work intends to deduce the 
social dimension of the right from the natural background of the individual subjec-
tivity. He also highlights the effectual character of the condition to be recognized, 
whereas the previous condition of solitary desiring is conceived as abstract and un-
true. Therefore, he considers recognition as a phenomena articulated on both the 
level of nature and sociality, because it emerges from the natural dimension of the 
individual will and generates the social practices and the normativity (Testa 2009). 
However, normativity is a quite complicated issue in Hegel’s philosophy and it is 
not completely explained through the notion of recognition. In fact, he intends to 
demonstrate that norms and institutions are the result of an act of self-determination 
and freedom exerted by those individuals who are also subjected to these norms. 
In the first pages of his Philosophy of Right he, in fact, explains his philosophy of 
action by means of an articulated analysis of the will at the basis of his ethics. This 
analysis contains many elements of a metaphysics of action since it deals with the 
deduction of a-priori aspects of subjectivity revealing the identity of freedom and 
will and the indeterminate and potentially infinite character of the first singular per-
son as the primary source of action.
22
 Such infinity of the will faces the limitation 
represented by otherness’ independence and stands for the very epicenter of the 
free attitude of self-conscious life.
23
 This natural characteristic of the will to be free 
and infinite points out that the peculiar relation of the subjectivity with otherness 
 
21 Hegel JS (1993), 205: “Das Anerkanntsein ist unmittelbare Wirklichkeit, und in ihrem Elemente 
die Person, zuerst als Fürsichsein überhaupt; sie is genießend and arbeitend. - Erst hier hat die Be-
gierde das Recht aufzutreten; denn sie ist wirklich; d.h. sie selbst hat allgemeines, geistiges Sein. Arbeit 
Aller und für All, und Genuß - Genuß Aller; jeder dient dem Anderen, und leistet Hilfe - oder das 
Individuum hat hier erst als einzelnes Dasein. Vorher ist es nur abstraktes, oder unwahres.” 
22 Hegel PR (1991), § 4 
23 Hegel PR (1991), § 5: “The will contains the element of pure indeterminacy or of the ‘I’’s pre 
reflection into itself, in which every limitation, every content, whether present immediately through 
nature, through need, desires, and drives, or given and determined in some other ways, is dissolved; 
this is the limitless infinity of absolute abstraction or universality, the pure thinking of oneself” 
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consists in its striving for achieving independence from external conditionings. 
However, subjectivity concretely requires a determined or actual content such pur-
poses, intentions, procedures and practices, whereas the identification of will and 
freedom is general and based on a mere methodological connotation. When we 
switch the attention from the formal requisites of free will to the real and concrete 
dimension in which willing subjects act, we have to determine the content of this 
willing and acting. At this point the questions are two: 1) how is generated the con-
tent of acting? and 2) what kind of relation is that between the metaphysical requi-
sites of will and its actual content? Following Hegel this content can be either deter-
mined by nature or generated by the concept of spirit,
24
 i.e. it either depends from 
natural needs or from the development of shared ethical contents. Eventually, the 
determination of the content of will is possible only insofar it respects individual 
“self-reference of negativity”
25
 proper of self-consciousness. In other words, “free-
dom lies neither in indeterminacy nor in determinacy, but is both at once”
26
 because 
it must preserve the natural characteristic of infinity proper of self-consciousness. 
Will needs, hence, a content but such content must abide by the fundamental nat-
ural requisites of self-conscious life, i.e. infinity and self-referring negativity. In fact, 
in the long tradition of ethics and philosophy of right the content of will has been 
fundamentally identified in terms of norms, values and laws that are also expected 
to not harm the natural requisites of freedom and self-conscious life. Following He-
gel, we can satisfy this expectation if we develop norms, values and norms that do 
not alienate will, but rather are the product of the will itself and endogenous out-
come of its natural disposition and purpose. Since these requisites are conceived as 
fundamental for life, we can affirm that Hegel’s conception of normative is elabo-
rated in order to preserve the original constitution of self-conscious life through the 
speculative freedom of the concept. This should also consent to avoid any trans-
formativist approach to this issue following which social freedom emerges as trans-
formation of speculative freedom. On the contrary, we maintain that social freedom 
conserves the general concept of freedom by which the subject can “overcome its 
original alienation from the world by finding itself to be fully realized in an other 
(the world), which, when comprehended philosophically, ceases the confront the 
subject as an external, inhospitable other” (Neuhouser 2000, 20). Social freedom 
is, hence, a sort of practical virtue by which the subject conceives of itself as free in 
relation to another similar self-conscious life, and norms and recognition does not 
represent a restraint of the will, but rather a practical attainment. In other words, 
the practical features of self-conscious life are connected to natural dispositions and 
entail the actualization of objective social practices by means of norms and social 
 
24 Hegel PR (1991), § 6. 
25 Hegel PR (1991), § 7. 
26 Hegel PR (1991), § 7Z. 
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interaction. In the next paragraph I will account for the normative and maintain that 
social practices represent the necessary accomplishment for the self-conscious life. 
5. SELF-CONSCIOUS LIFE AND SOCIAL PRACTICES 
We have seen that freedom means to be at once with oneself, self-mastery and 
self-determination, and this requires absence of any form of dependence from ex-
ternal orders and refusal of otherness’ independence. At the same time, social free-
dom means freedom within a social order, i.e. within a social context whose rules 
are socially acknowledged. In this paragraph I will claim that self-conscious life de-
velops social interaction and social orders by virtue of a natural disposition towards 
interpersonal relation and institutionalized practices. Socialization represents, 
hence, a natural need for a subject naturally predisposed to self-determination alt-
hough it implies the establishment of relations of dependence among members and 
on laws and norms. On certain conditions this relation of dependence within social 
orders does not represent a hindrance to freedom, but rather its very actualization. 
Why are social orders necessary for the accomplishment of self-conscious life and 
which are the conditions under which social orders afford freedom? 
Social orders result necessary for the self-conscious life by virtue of the natural-
istic continuity between the very natural requisites of life and social integration. As 
we have already seen, for self-consciousness the relation to another subject having 
the same structure of self-referring negativity is necessary for establishing a dimen-
sion in which the natural features and needs are intersubjectively acknowledged and 
not solipsistically elaborated. The point here is that self-conscious life strives to the 
transition to universal self-consciousness in order to attain genuine human freedom 
and this is only possible by rising above the selfish individuality of natural will and 
desiring. The interpersonal relationships yields a discipline among individuals 
which is at the basis of overcoming egotism originated from material needs and 
evolving life into the social practices of a form of life. This is what Hegel actually 
means in the following passages about the relationship of mastery and bondage: 
Since the bondsman works for the master and therefore not in the exclusive interest 
of his own individuality, his desire acquires the breadth of being not only the desire 
of a particular individual but containing within itself the desire of another… This sub-
jugation of the bondsman’s egotism forms the beginning of genuine human freedom… 
Without having experienced the discipline that breaks self-will, no one becomes free, 
rational, and capable of command. To become free, to acquire the capacity for self-





27 Hegel PM (2007), § 435Z. 
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In spite of the asymmetrical and one-sided character of freedom achieved in the 
mastery-bondage relationship, the passage shows the importance of the interper-
sonal interaction for overcoming selfish individuality originated by the natural con-
ditions of the self-conscious life. Socialization is the fundamental instrument by 
which self-consciousness gains the universality represented by shared and socially 
acknowledged practices, which are expression of the “wider context” of the human 
species. In fact, universality is inherently related to self-conscious life, which negates 
the particularity of individual expression of the species in order to preserve the spe-
cies itself. The species represents, hence, the universality of the individual living 
beings and realizes itself by means of the practical dimension of the wide context of 
the forms of life, in which individuals actualize their natural prerequisites. Norms, 
institutions, rules and social interaction shape the universal context of practices, 
which overcomes selfish individuality and is based on the living dimension of the 
species. Self-conscious life is concretely free when it acquires a social and practical 
shape because it is only within the wide context of its form of life that it becomes 
universal. This introduces another ambit of the investigation about self-conscious 
life, which is represented by its historicity and the linked contingent evolution of the 
forms of life of a genus. We are, hence, in the dimension of the philosophy of 
history that will be addressed in the next paragraph.  
6. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE SELF-CONSCIOUS SPE-
CIES 
The idea of self-consciousness certainly represents the core of the Hegelian 
thinking because it reflects the structure of both the practical and cognitive disposi-
tions of the self-conscious type (Gattung) or species. It is, hence, crucial for under-
standing both the individual and the social attitudes because the interpersonal rela-
tions are also constituted by means of an act of self-understanding, which entails the 
possibility of the autonomous evolution of the practical dimension by virtue of the 
disposition to understand reality under an order of concepts and autonomously 
evolve forms of practices. Since self-understanding implies also the negation of what 
is independent, negativity represents the power of the self-conscious life to deter-
mine the concept of itself by autonomously faces external conditioning and opposi-
tion (Ng 2017). As we have already seen, this opposition can arise due both natural 
factors and other self-conscious individuals, but it can also be identified in the uni-
versal world history, namely the entity by which we explain the evolution of the self-
conscious species over time and generations. World human history describes how 
distinct civilisations thrive and evolve different typologies of social practices by op-
posing their own self-awareness to the endless evolution and transformation of the 
human history itself. Hegel’s idea of world history accounts above all for the devel-
opment and downfall of human civilizations in the proscenium of the narrative of 
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the human species. This dynamical transformations are determined by the power 
of self-consciousness to contrast the inexorable proceeding of the events by means 
of the speculative force of negativity. This dialectics between human species and the 
historical evolution of the practices is what defines the species itself as the outcome 
of historic transformations. Negativity in self-consciousness is potentially infinite and 
represents the effort to overcome and master the restless evolution of the universal 
and to avoid the downfall. Therefore, world human history is shaped by the dialec-
tics of self-consciousness facing the universality of time and evolving specific forms 
of practices and institutions. This represents the fundamental distinguishable fea-
ture of the self-conscious species whose activities are determined by means of a 
collective and historical act of self-understanding persisting among generations and 
determining the human history as the history of the evolution of ethics, institutions, 
norms and social practices. The central point for Hegel is that self-consciousness is 
the feature by which the human species understands itself, builds a community, 
actively defines norms, ethical values and practices and pro-actively faces the evolu-
tion of world history. However, how is it possible that human civilizations decline 
and die in spite of their universal values and forms of life, such as the ancient Roman 
and Greek ones? Following Hegel, the end of a civilization is not determined by the 
universality of its values, but rather by the fact that this universality “can appear … 
as what is posited over against it” (Hegel PWH 2011, 161). This passage highlights 
that the universal course of human history determines the downfall of those peoples 
who do not understand themselves as an ethical organization, i.e. as an organization 
held together by means of universal values. The act of self-understanding is crucial 
for the spiritual life of a people because it does not only exist as a complex of mate-
rial infrastructures and facilities, but rather it inwardly exists as result of a self-aware 
understanding of its role in the course of the historical events. The self-reflection 
gives instruments to understand the real nature of history  beyond particularity and 
material needs and gives a people the opportunity to have a role in determining its 
progress. This because the evolution of both the human history and the human 
species is determined through the concept we have of them and is subjected to nor-
mative and universal principles, which are not understandable by a mere material-
istic analysis scrutinizing the externality of the singular events. Those principles are 
instead the explicit articulation of the inwardness of the idea, or the translation of 
the interiority of the idea into the exteriority of the existence.
28
 Hegel applies an 
important principle of his logic of life to the philosophy of history, that the abstract 
and internal idea requires the externality of existence in order to gain expression 
and, simultaneously, the existence of any historical occurrence can only be under-
stood as the expression of an ideal frame of concepts and principles. In other words, 
there cannot properly be human history without a self-conscious subject able to 
 
28 Hegel PWH (2011), 172. 
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think it. In fact, the philosophical definition of world history must be comprehen-
sive of its “universal purposes that transcend the sphere in which ordinary and par-
ticular inclinations can be satisfied … purposes that have the meaning in the world 
history, purposes that are carried out with energy, by an abstract willing that is often 
directed against the happiness of individual themselves and of other individuals.”
29
  
Hegel’s interest in the philosophy of history was probably waked by the question 
about the decline and end of human civilizations and by the course of history. In 
the Hegelian formal analysis of history, the reason why civilizations decay is deter-
mined by the fact that although their ethical sphere is universal it is also determined 
and can be overcome by a higher universal order of values and practices overwhelm-
ing it.
30
 In fact, the ethical dimension of a civilization represents a determined ex-
pression of the self-conscious life and, like every determination, is the negation of 
something other. The succession of historical civilizations is the result of the fact 
that a single civilization is not able to satisfy all the possibilities of human social and 
institutionalized practices. The advantage given by the philosophy of history is that 
of reflecting about the real nature of historical contingency and to counterpose to it 
the freedom act of determining the concept of human-species and its evolution. As 
Karen Ng (2017) rightly maintains, human history represents the history of the evo-
lution of our species, which determines as self-conscious and self-reflecting form of 
life the immanent standards governing meaningful activity and defining ethical val-
ues and social practices. Whilst all biological species live and act accordingly with 
natural given standards determined by their biological constitution, self-conscious 
beings ask themselves about what is right and ethically valid. They actively deter-
mine the principles of good practice because they give sense to what is universally 
right by an inferential act of reflection and argumentation excluding the influence 
of external factors (Pinkard 2017, 31 and 146). It is an act that takes place inwardly 
and excludes the influence of external and material factors and for this reason is an 
act of actualized freedom. Human history can be, hence, defined by making re-
course to a formal analysis of the self-conscious life and its disposition to define 
itself by the speculative act of self-referring negativity and the actualization of its own 
universality. Such actualization becomes freedom when a civilization is able to un-
derstand the universal shape of the human species and to acknowledge the historical 
 
29 Hegel PWH (2011), 172. In the same page, Hegel defines world history as a “formal activity” 
or “formal unity” that can be correctly understood by a logical act of abstraction which is proper of 
self-reflection. 
30 Hegel PWH (2011), 174: “A universality that is higher than the preceding universal, higher than 
what is now specified in contrast to it as particular, can be referred to as the next type. It was already 
inwardly present in the preceding universal but had not yet come into currency, so that its actual 
existence was precarious and inwardly broken. It is precisely the great historical figures, the world~ 
historical individuals, who grasp such a universal and turn into their purposes.” 
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evolution by a conceptual or speculative act of self-understanding. Otherwise, grasp-
ing itself in the form of particularity instead of universality produces self-seeking and 
refusal of the historical course, contributing to the spiritual death of a civilization.
31
 
In fact, understanding the universal concept of world human history requires an act 
of self-reflection that goes beyond the particularity and singularity proper of self-
promoting. Grasping itself in the form of singularity, even if this singularity expresses 
universal values, produces the downfall of a civilization because it keeps it far from 
the evolution of the human species. What Hegel means by maintaining that univer-
sality “can appear … as what is posited over against” a nation, a state or a civilization 
is that nations ought to be aware about the nature and evolution of history in order 
that they are able to sustain their own downfall by fostering an ethical sense of their 
own historic destiny and tasks. Hegel’s philosophy of history aims at identifying the 
requirements needed by a civilization for mastering the contingency of human his-
tory and the steady succession of new forms of social practices.   
Such conception of world history is strictly connected to the Hegelian conception 
of self-consciousness and spirit because it conceives of the historical evolution as 
outcome of the natural features of the human species (Pinkard 2017, 11). It requires 
actualizing the concept of self-consciousness in life and in the present time under 
different demands and needs and pursuing freedom and independence from exter-
nal mastery. The understanding of one’s place in history is ruled by the logical req-
uisites established by being a self-conscious subject that does not merely pursue de-
sires, but rather aims at taking place under a specific concept of itself. Since spirit is 
the way in which our species conceive of itself as an unitary and collective subject, 
the history of this species has to be understood in terms of the history of a collective 
subject placing itself under specific concepts and ideals such as justice, freedom, 
happiness, right and many others. These pursuits do not aim at the satisfaction of 
organic needs that are determined by given biological conditions, but rather at the 
satisfaction of a specific concept of itself that the self-conscious species establishes 
on the basis of an ideal form of life. This the reason why history can be conceived 
as a logical evolution of the idea that spirit has of itself and of the human species.  
Moreover, among nations there are those that take active part in shaping history 
and in determining the concepts under which the human species should be placed 
and thought. The way how Hegel treats non-European civilization is certainly af-
fected by an archaic prejudice about the supremacy of the European culture due to 
an alleged capacity to evolve advanced institutions and knowledge. At the time of 
Hegel Europe was the core of modernity and progress, in which men and women 
 
31 Hegel PWH (2011), 163: “This subjective inwardness, grasping itself in the form of singularity, 
is what produces vanity, self-seeking, etc. - qualities that are contrary to faith, to immediacy. Thus self-
interests and passions are unleashed as destructive qualities, and the destruction of a people runs 
rampant. This is not natural death but the death of an ethical life, a death that appears in ethical life 
as the tearing apart of the members.” 
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felt subjected to an universal ideal of reason immune to superstitions and religion 
and acted consequently by developing a free and wealthy society. In contrast, other 
non-European civilizations were seen as subjected to false idols and beliefs and their 
underdevelopment was considered as outcome of a non freed humanity. Certainly, 
Hegel disregarded in his world history many significative achievement of non-Euro-
pean cultures that have also an impact in the western civilization. However, what is 
compelling for us is the idea that the Hegelian formal analysis of history implies a 
relative hierarchy between the different expressions that it has. He observes that 
there are civilizations that during a precise arc of time determine the human history 
by determining their own values, ethical life, practices and institutions. This is the 
case of ancient Rome that became the center of the world because it excelled in 
many aspect of social life from engineering to justice, from political institution to 
religious rituals. Hegel is surely right when he maintains that the evolution of the 
concept of species happens in the history through those civilizations able to intro-
duce changes and improvement in the social practices. In his analysis of world hu-
man history he actually aims to account for its evolution as something that can be 
managed and controlled through an act of self-reflection because of its spiritual na-
ture. The material conditions are in fact shaped and determined by the self-con-
scious’ disposition to negate external powers and conditioning, and in this way his-
tory reveals to be the rational course of events at the basis of the evolution of hu-
manity. However, this evolution does not represent a chronology, but rather the 
spiritual evolution of the self-conscious life by its disposition to self-determination 
and emancipation from external conditioning. The history of human civilization is, 
hence, subjected to the dynamical development of the practices and ethical values 
and is strongly connected to the way how humanity as a species conceive of itself 
and its own form of life.  
7. CONCLUSION 
In this contribution I have addressed the Hegelian notion of species (Gattung)  
and how he relates it to his theory on self-conscious life and social practices. I 
pointed out that the self-conscious species, namely the human, cannot be under-
stood without making recourse to its disposition to undertake a self-referred inter-
action with the independent and external reality by fostering self-determination, ea-
gerness towards independence from external conditioning, freedom, social prac-
tices and human history. The notion of human species requires the understanding 
of the dialectics that the self-conscious life undertakes with reality in order to estab-
lish a system of concepts under which social practices and their historical evolution 
can be thought. I have also focused on the continuity between self-conscious life, 
speculative freedom, social freedom and freedom in history that Hegel explains by 
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highlighting the very natural attitude of self-reflective negativity proper of self-con-
sciousness. By understanding freedom through a formal analysis of the nature of 
self-consciousness Hegel is able to develop a very sharp investigation into sociality 
and history and to explain them in a coherent and unitary way by inferentially un-
folding or making explicit the idea that is implicit in their external structure and 
chronology of events. 
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